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KEYNOTE ADDRESS 
THE HONORABLE PETER R. FISHER 
UNDERSECRETARY FOR DOMESTIC FINANCE 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 
  
THE NEED TO REDUCE REGULATORY 
ARBITRAGE 
he case for creating a financial “super regulator” does not 
rest on the existence of financial supermarkets but, 
rather, just the opposite.   
We are living in a financial bazaar where different types of 
financial intermediaries offer us competing products and ser-
vices to meet our needs for borrowing, saving and investment.  
While individual vendors may offer us a wider or narrower ar-
ray of choices, because of the diversity of both the forms of in-
termediation and of the vendors providing these different forms, 
we need a system of financial regulation that will promote — 
not hinder — real competition among all of the vendors of fi-
nancial services. 
In these terms I think there is a compelling case for greater 
coherence in our rule writing process for financial services, per-
haps even for a “super regulator.”  But I draw a sharp distinc-
tion between financial regulation — rule writing — and finan-
cial supervision.  Our biggest mistake is that we continue to 
lump these two together.  The promise of Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
will never be fulfilled so long as we continue to muddle the dis-
tinction between rule writing for financial services, on the one 
hand, and the supervision of financial intermediaries, on the 
other.  
A single federal rule writer, or rule writing process, would 
need to respect and nurture the existence of different forms of 
financial intermediation and, at the same time, encourage com-
petition among both the forms and the firms that provide them.   
A single rule writer would need to respect two principles: 
first, that like products and like services should receive a like 
regulatory treatment and, second, that distinct products and 
distinct services should receive distinct regulatory treatment.   
T 
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The rule writer need only have the wisdom to know the differ-
ence. 
Supervision — the hands on business of looking over the 
shoulders of the financial intermediaries — will and should re-
main divided among a number of different agencies and organi-
zations, focused discretely on individual firms, products, and 
different policy objectives.  We will and should have functional 
supervision and we will and should also have goal-oriented su-
pervision.  Somebody is going to supervise banks and somebody 
is going supervise insurance companies and somebody is going 
to try to protect consumers and investors.  I see very few, if any, 
benefits from rolling all of these different purposes and objec-
tives into a “super supervisor.” 
Having stated by my conclusions let me now explain my logic. 
I am skeptical of the view that the future belongs to large 
conglomerates operating as financial “supermarkets.”   Large 
financial firms do have some important advantages, among 
them greater potential for diversification.  Diversification 
spreads risk and stabilizes earnings.  Yet large firms must con-
tinuously work to achieve an effective diversification of their 
exposures and to avoid risk concentrations lurking inside seem-
ingly diversified portfolios of assets. 
Advances in information and communication technology off-
set some of the scale and diversification advantages that large 
institutions may have.  Today, technology permits small firms 
to outsource many functions and thereby recapture some of the 
advantages previously associated only with economies of scale.   
Thus, I expect that we will have a world in which nimble fi-
nancial institutions of varying sizes, including both financial 
supermarkets and more focused financial firms, will compete 
with one another.      
As a society, we have — and want to retain — different, com-
peting forms of financial intermediation, whether based on 
charter, product, function, or other form.  We can call them 
banking, insurance, or investment activities or products; we can 
call them credit intermediation, temporal intermediation and 
resource allocation; or we can call them making payments and 
pooling risks.   
For my purpose today, it does not matter what typology you 
want to have in mind.  We need only observe that we have dif-
ferent forms of financial intermediation and, as a society, we 
File: FISHER REMARKS Base Macro.doc Created on: 2/19/2003 3:24 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 11:30 AM 
2003] KEYNOTE ADDRESS 457 
want there to be a healthy competition among these forms and 
the firms that provide them. 
For our society the objective is clear: we want progressive im-
provement in the efficiency with which we convert savings into 
investment.  Both collectively and as individual savers and in-
vestors, we want the greatest efficiency possible in this process 
— minimizing the loss of savings, maximizing the investment.  
Efficiency in this process promotes the growth of our economy. 
What process will create a progressive improvement in the e f-
ficiency with which savings are converted into investment? 
The dynamic process begins with the inefficiency of financial 
markets which, through competition, tend toward efficiency.  
The economists’ assumption about efficient markets is not help-
ful because it assumes away the important process of squeezing 
out inefficiencies.  When individual financial intermediaries 
pursue a profit maximizing strategy in a competitive environ-
ment, society benefits from the increased efficiency with which 
savings are converted into investment.   
As this process unfolds, as a rough proxy for improvements in 
the productivity of capital itself, we should expect to see the 
aggregate profits of financial intermediaries decline as a per-
centage of our savings and our investment.  The profits of indi-
vidual firms might grow and aggregate profits might grow in 
nominal terms, but the better outcome for society would be a 
decline in total financial intermediary profits as a share of total 
savings. 
From the viewpoint of a particular franchise, this isn’t always 
how financial firms, their lobbyists and even their supervisors 
tend to approach the subject.   
The history of regulatory practice too frequently reflects a dif-
ferent assumption: that to ensure the stability of a given form of 
intermediation we should provide individual firms  with stable 
and positive earnings, in part, by limiting the competition they 
face.  I think this is misguided.  
I take it as given that too much of our financial regulatory 
process is aimed at limiting rather than expanding effective 
competition.  We have too much, rather than too little, regula-
tory arbitrage.  Rules that expand competition are in the public 
interest.  Rules that limit competition — either directly or by 
bestowing unique privileges on a narrow set of firms — are not 
in the public interest because they limit the forces that help us 
efficiently convert savings into investment.  
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In financial services this is not principally a function of 
“agency capture.”  Individual firms do have incentives to limit 
competition and there may be some degree of agency capture.  
But in financial services a problem arises because the charter-
ing regulatory authority has an incentive to promote the 
“soundness” of its particular form of intermediation by limiting 
the competition.  Each chartering regulatory authority has just 
a single corner or piece of the total capital structure of financial 
intermediation and, thus, has an incentive to “protect” the 
revenue sources of its franchisees in order to assure their 
“soundness”. 
We need to clarify the objectives of the rule writing authority, 
or the rule writing process, to ensure that it promotes rather 
than hinders competition among forms of intermediation.  To do 
this, the rule-writing process must respect the different forms 
intermediation: products that are distinctly banking or dis-
tinctly insurance should receive distinct treatment, but for 
products overlapping industries, we need a set of like rules for 
like products.   
This would ensure that rule writing not stand in the way of 
competition at the frontiers between intermediation forms and 
firms.  Perhaps we should have single, federal financial  rule 
writer to serve this objective.  It might also be plausible to 
maintain separate agencies charged with rule writing, but ac-
countable to these standards through an appellate process.  
There could also be a rule writing committee, with binding au-
thority, composed of distinct supervisory agencies.  Regardless 
of what mechanism evolves, our objective must be greater co-
herence in rule writing to promote effective competition. 
One thing I am certain of is that we will not put all of federal 
financial supervision and regulation into a single agency, nor 
should we.  Concentrating so much regulatory and supervisory 
power in one place is simply not within the bounds of our politi-
cal tradition.  More importantly, financial supervision needs to 
be focused on specific lines of business and sets of risks.   
The existence of financial supermarkets and conglomerates 
does pose a challenge for supervisors.  Somebody needs to focus 
on risks at the holding company level while others need to focus 
on risks in particular business lines.  But it does not follow that 
we need a single federal financial supervisor. 
Financial supervision almost invariably originates with a de-
sire to avoid or mitigate bad outcomes — losses to depositors, to 
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investors, or to consumers.  As such, supervision tends to begin 
by focusing on the “negative tail” outcomes — making sure that 
supervised entities avoid the most harmful practices.  The more 
effective way to avoid negative tail outcomes, however, is to fo-
cus on improving median and mode performance and to encour-
age “positive tail” outcomes.    
Indeed, the only compelling case that I can see for financial 
supervision is as a means of more rapidly disseminating best 
practice among firms whom we wish to see fail less frequently 
than would otherwise be the case.  To redistribute best prac-
tices, the supervisor needs to know what best practice is and, 
therefore, needs to know something quite specific about the 
business of the firms he or she supervises.  In addition, to be 
effective, supervision needs to be directed at the level of risk-
bearing entities and, within financial holding company struc-
tures, there are multiple levels of risk-bearing entities. 
Pausing just a moment to consider all the different forms of 
intermediation and businesses that deliver these services — 
from credit cards to mortgages to mutual funds to annuities — 
and to the different corporate forms that can provide their ser-
vices, will give us sufficient insight, I think, to recognize what 
little sense it would make to roll all of financial supervision into 
a single agency.  We may, at present, have more federal finan-
cial supervisors than is optimal.  But I am certain that a single 
federal financial supervisor would not be optimal either. 
The distinction I am drawing between rule writing and su-
pervision is not new.  Indeed, for almost thirty years we have 
been stumbling toward recognition that we want a common set 
of rules for financial intermediaries while, at the same time, we 
want to maintain discrete supervisors for different types of fi-
nancial firms.   
Starting in the early 1970s, in the wake of the Herstatt crisis, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision began to write 
common rules, eventually leading to the more than twenty-year 
effort to write common capital rules for internationally active 
banks.  Also internationally, in recent years there have been 
increasingly frequent joint efforts among bank, securities and 
insurance regulators.   
Here in the United States, the President’s Working Group on 
Financial Markets, the FFIEC, and numerous congressionally 
mandated joint studies over the years all reflect efforts of one 
kind or another to harmonize regulatory practices.  The 
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s functional regulation provisions and 
rulemaking process for authorizing new activities of financial 
holding companies have also represented steps in this direction. 
I think we should stop dragging our feet and accept what we 
have long been seeking in a piecemeal, erratic fashion.   
A more coherent, unified rule writing process would properly 
recognize different modes of intermediation while encouraging 
competition among them.  Retarding this process is not in the 
public interest and will only serve to decrease the potential effi-
ciency of converting our savings into investment.  The supervi-
sory process, however, will and should remain diverse, aimed at 
each risk-bearing entity within financial firms and at different 
policy objectives.   
If we continue to muddle along, the promise of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act to adapt our financial laws to the realities of 
the 21st century will never be fulfilled. 
 
